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MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND FAMILY SIZE
IN RURAL PHILIPPINE HOUSEHOLDS
R. E, Evenson and J. A. Roumasset
In recent years economic studieshave shown that rural families
respondto market signalsand to the availability of new technology and
public sector infrastructure. Economic studies have also shown that
market transctionsare not costless.Information asto pricesand oppor-
tunities to purchasegoodsiscostly to the suppliersof goods.The buyer
of goods or of labor servicesmust also incur costs to search for goods
or workers and must often purchasegoods or labor serviceswith very
poor information. These costsof engagingin market transactionsvary
a greatdealoverthe development process.
In poorly developed market economies, high transactions and
related costs,produce a pattern of market organizations with heavy
relianceon traditional institutions for handlingtransactions.The family
is one such institution becausefamily ties or bonds allow more effi-
cien,tcontractual arrangementsthan do markets.The family enterprise
dominates such economies. In highly developed market economies,
market transactions are low cost. Competitive suppliers provide in-
formation at low cost..The public sector providesgoodsand standards
that facilitate transactions.Communication is low cost. In suchecon-
omies the family enterpriselosesits advantage in many sectorsof the
economy, and market transactionsdominate economic activity. In this
paper we develop a framework for explaining the transition from non-
market to market institutions. We usethe framework to generatespeci-
fic hypotheses which are confronted, in turn, with'evidencefrom the
rural Philippines.Our specificfocus ison the most pervasive and impor--
tant of all traditional institutions - the rural household.
Professor of Economics, Economic Growth Center,Yale University, and
Professor of Economics, University of Hawaii, respectively.
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The framework we proposeisan integration of the newhousehold
economics(NHE) and the new institutional economics(NIE). The new
household economics usesa utility maximization model to analyze a
variety of householdactivities including•home production, fertility and
the allocation of time. Having abstractedfrom the costs of alternative
economic organization, however, NHEis not well suitedto understand-
ing which activities will be organized in the market system. The NIE
focuses explicitly on organizational choice by incorporating transac-
tion costconsiderationsbut sofar it (NIE) hasfocusedattention•prima-
rily on the firm (Williamson 1975; Stiglitz 1976; Roumasset1978; Rou-
masset and Uy 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983). By integrating these
theories, we proposeto providea framework for explaining the compa-
rative roles of both the household farm and the market in allocating
resources.
Theoretical Background
Under the precondition for a full Walrasianequilibrium, we do not
need a separate theory of the agricultural household. The household
simply maximizes its utility subject to a budget constraint which,in-
cludes the income of its profit maximizing farm. The widespreadin-
terest in a separate theory of the "peasant Farm" can therefore be
interpreted asstemmingfrom the belief that these neoclassicalassump-
tions are inappropriate for understandingthe rural household-farm. In
particular, the transaction costs, of usingmarkets and imperfections in
markets render the separating hyperplane between farm and household
activities inapplicable.1
Consider the following agricultural household model of the NHE
Type. It postulatesa householdutility function:
(1) U : U (N, Lc, E, Lm, Lf, S)
where
N = the number of children
E = human capital investment per child (i.e., schoolingand
health)
Lc = leisureperchild
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Lrn, Lf = leisure of the mother and father
S = a bundle of other goods
The following production constraintsare assumedto hold:
(2) N = N(Xn, tnm)
E = E(X,, tem. t=C)
S = S(Xs, t=rn,tsc)
A .= A (Xa' taf, tah, ' Ntac, L )
• where A is an agricultural good and A ( ) is its production function,
Xf is a vector of purchasedinputs and t d is the time allocated to agri-
cultural production by the father, tah IStime by hired workers and
NtaciS time allocated by children. L is agricultural land. ForN, Eand
S the constraintsare "production-like" and may be thought of as home
production from vectors of purchasedgoodsXn. X e and X s and time
allocated by the mother and children. C measurescommunity health
andschoolin&
The.followingtime restrictionsalso hold:
(3) Lc. = Tc - tec - tec - t wc - tsc
Lm = tm -tnm - NEtem - tsm -- twm
Lf = Tf- tar -- twf
where twdtwm' and twf are time spent working in a labor market and
tec is time per child spent in educational activities, These restrictions
simply account for all time. The financial constraint facing the house-
hold is
(4 ) V + Wmtwm + Wf t wf + NWc t wc + 1_ a = Pn Xn e Xe + Ps Xs
where _;a = PaA - PcXc - Whtah - Wctac .
This constraint states that nonlabor'income, I/, plus earningsin
labor rnarets( W m, Wf W cand W h are wagerates) plusnet agricultural
profits, must equal spendingon •purchasedgoods Xn, X e, and Xs.The
problem of the householdis then to maximize household •utility (1-)sub-144 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ject to the production (2), time (3), and financial constraints (4). The
problem can be simplified by combining the constraints into a single
"full income" constraint. This is done by substituting the time con-
straints (3) directly into (4). This yields:
(5) V +Wm( T m _tnmNEtem_tsm _ Lm) +Wf (Tf-taf- If)+
llN( Wc(.T c- tec -- tac, -L c ) + PaA l_ X il= Wh T _
= PnXn+ NEPeX e + PsXs
When we incorporate the following definitions of intensities."
X'n =XnlN:Xe =Xe/E: X s =Xs /9.:t'nm = t rtn /N;
t'em = tern/E; t'sm IS;, t'ec = tec /E
We can rewrite (5) in "shadow price" form.
(6) V + WmTm + WfTf + NWeTe + PaA - Wntah .._--L m(wm )+
Lf (Wf )+ALL c (Wc)+S(PsX' s + Wmt'Sm)+Ne(PeX'e +
WcT'cl N + Wmt'em ) +N ( PnX'n + Wmt'nm - Weta=_ Wct wc)
The household can be Viewed as maximizing utility (1) subject to
(6). This yields a standard consumer behavior result except that shadow
prices are substituted for market prices. The model, however, does pre-
sume costless markets..This household values the agricultural good at
Pa, the mltrket price and its household labor at market wages.With high
transactions costs,this will not bethe case.The household will find that
becauseit is costly to sell A and costly to buy A it will face a "wedge"
between its real net sales price and its real net purchase price. The exis-
tence of this wedge will induce the household to reduce its transactions
in the food and will forge a link or interrelationship between consump-
tion and production.
Figure 1 illustrates this. Equilibrium rice production, R*, isdeter-
mined where the marginal opportunity cost schedule intei'sects the
household demand curve. If the intersection occurs in the intermediate
region as shown, then the family is self-sufficient. If the opportunityEVENSON & ROUMASSET: MARKETS AND FAMILY SIZE 145
cost of labor required to produce one more unit of rice is high asrepre-
sented by MC_,•then the family will buy rice•at the opportun ty cost
Pb" In the range of self-sufficiency, equilibrium is determined by the
household demand for rice. Thus, production and consumption deci-
sionsareinterrelated.
I W
MC' ! MC= . ,.
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Pb = buying price
Ps , = selling price
PR = shadow price
MCL = marginal opportunity costof labor= MPL
The relevant economic pricei s equal to Pbsolong asthe family
isbuying rice; and to Ps if the family is selling rice and isCoincident
with the household demand curve in the intermediate region. The
difference between Pb:and Ps dependslargely on transportation costs.
It can also reflect high communications costs and local monopoly
power. Note, however, that local markets can serveto reducethe price146 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
differential even in remote regions. Pb and Ps are local prices and both
may below in remote regions.
The real economic price of labor is also bounded by the buying
and selling prices of labor, i.e., how much the family must pay to hire
and monitor labor and the net wage that family members can earn
outside the labor markets. Once training, supervision, information and
transporation costs are taken into account_ the range between these
prices can be large, especially for skilled labor (Roumasset and Uy
1980)
The excess burden analysis of the NIE can be brought to bear
on the issue at this point. This analysisallows us to introduce a number
of costs of market organization and functioning. We assume that
efficiency is a powerful determinant of organizational form. The
most efficient organization is defined as that which minimizes the
agency costs that arise because contracts are not costlessly written and
enforced (Roumasset and Uy 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983).
Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding'a
set of contracts among'agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual
loss incurred becausethe cost of full enforcement of contracts exceeds the
benefits. (Famaand lensen, 1983, p. 327)
The emphasis on minimizing agency costs can be justified either
as a part of profit-maximization (Stiglitz 1976) or for its value in en-
suring the firms survival (Alchian 1950, Fama and Jensen 1980).
Different organizational forms will be appropriate for different
activities and in different environments. For example, piece-rates
may be paid to workers where '!quality shirking" can be easily meas-
ured by the inspection of the finished task (e.g., planted cane points).
Where simple inspection does not serve as an efficient quality-control
mechanism (e.g., for applying chemical inputs), then wage rates may
be preferred (Roumasset and Uy 1983).
The economic/physical environment may similarly influence the
choice of organizational form. For example, Where management
of production and the resource base are relatively important, there is a
tendency to observe specialized forms, wherein most-of labor and
perhaps even management is hired. On poor quality land, howevef:_
where decision-making and land management are less important relative
to the problem of labor shirking, organizations such as family farms,
which award the residual to labor, are employed (Roumasset and Uy
1983). .EVENSON & ROUMASSET: MARKETS AND FAMILY SIZE .147
Farm size may be viewed as being codetermined with organiza-
tional form. Family farms will accordingly be relatively small and vary
with household size (Chayanov 1966). Commercial farms chosen be-
cause of the relative importance of mangement will tend to be larger
to exploit the economies of scaleof decision making.
Figure 2 shows costsasa function of supervision time by the farm
manager. The curve $UPC shows the costs of supervision activity to
the farm. (These rise nonlinearly since some supervision can be done
while the farm manager is working with the workers being supervised.
As more time is required for supervision, joint work becomes more
difficult. ) The curve $HC(H) depicts lost profits from time shirking
by workers in a high transactions cost environment (i.e. with low social
cohesion). The curve SHC(L) depicts the samecostsin an environment
where it is easier to recruit workers and enforce contracts. The farm
manager is assumedto choose the level of supervision to minimize the
"agency costs," i.e. the total costsof supervision plus shirking for a
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Supervision can be purchased in markets by farmers, as well as
supplied by farm managers. For example, a farmer may make a piece
rate contract with a "team" for transplanting or harvesting work where
the team provides its own internal supervision in order to establish a
"reputation" for low levels of shirking. Some farm operations may
be conducted under one form of contract, while others usea different
form. The farmers may have an incentive to use"tie-in" contracts
where a worker agrees to provide services such as weeding in order
to earn the right to harvest.
As communication improves and new forms of contracts are
devised, agency costs tend to decline. This tendency may beoffset,
however, where family and village institutions become weaker, such
.that traditional sanctions against shirking are lesseffective. In general.
new institutions are then developed tosubstitute for the loss of tradi-
tional sanctions.
The existenceof these costsadds a newdegree ofcomplexity
to household analysis. Inlrural labor markets, the real cost ofhired
labor to the farm manager would be higher than the nominal wage
(or equivalent piece rate) by the minimized agency cost. Costs of
production would be higher but unless there is a differential in the
agency cost for family and hired workers, this would not change
the nature of the shadow price computations.
The real cost to the farmer of hiring in labor will be the nominal
wage W ,plus the agency cost in the labor market [E* (/4).or
E* (L)] A family worker working off the farm will also.have to bear
transactions costs in high transaction costs environments, and thereal
hiring out wagefor the household will be lower than the nominal hiring
out wages(WF, Wm, W c) by theseadditional costs (or agency costs
from the perspectiveof the workers).
The analysisof householdbehavior wouldnow changebecausethe
householdfaces different real buying and sellingprices.Intuitively, it is
easy to see that transactions costsin the product markets push the
householdtransactionscostsin the consumesand consuminggoodsthat
it produces.The real costto the householdof a good that it produces
goesdown with a rise_ in transaction costs,and the real cost of a pur-
chasedgoodgoesup. Thus, the bundle of agricultural goodswill be al-
tered to includemore goodsconsumedby the household.
Even if there were no advantageto family labor in the sensethat
the agency cost of family labor is lowerthan the agencycostassociated
with hired workers, high transaction costs would also pushfarms to-
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ward self-sufficiency in labor. This is because a family worker on a farm
doesnot bear the transactionscostsof seekingand maintaining work in
a nonfamily job. A small farm with excesslabor, for example, could
rent land in competition with larger farms and "sell" its labor to itself,
thusavoidingtransactionscosts. ,
This tendency toward the self-sufficient farm will bestrengthened
considerably if the family institution itself provides a means for re-
ducing agency costs. There is abundant evidence that it does. Family
ties and obligations and sharing mechanismswithin the family reduce
the incentivesto shirk. The shirking costsof family workers are likewise
lower than those of hired workers becauseof family bonds and incen-
tives. The agency costsassociatedwith family workers is thus lower
than that for hired workers by E' = E * (H) - E * (L). This family pre-
mium, E', dependson the transactions cost environment. In low tran-
sactions cost environments it will be low. In high transactions costsit
will be relatively high becausethe family institution may be insulated
to somedegreefrom the factors causingcoststo be high.
Figure 3 showshow the real opportunity cost of family labor
varies by farm size and transaction cost environment. Two levelsof
transaction cost environments are depicted: low (E' and T_) and high
(E" and T"). In low transaction cost environment, farm sizesbelow
L (for a given family size, N) have an opportunity cost of labor that
is the nominal wage W h minus the costs that they incur in hiring out
their labor, T. As farm size increasesfrom L1 to L2 the farm is self-
sufficient in labor; it neither hires out labor nor hires in labor. For
farm sizes above L2, the farm hires in labor and the opportunity cost
orvalue of family labor is the hired wage rate W plus the agency cost
premiumE'. When transactions cost rise, the "wedge" gets largerand
the rangeof self-sufficiency getswider.
High transactions cost environments then place economic pres-
sures on farm (and other nonagricultural enterprises) to move toward
self-sufficiency in labor and in products; (The analysishas alsobeen
applied to credit markets;seeJamesand Roumasset1982.)
Family Sizeand TransactionsCosts
Reference to the agricultural household model shows that N,
the number of children desired by the family, will bea function of the
shadow price of children. The expression for the shadow price is
SP(N) = PnX'n + Wnt'nm,- Wct'ac- Wct'wc + E (SPE)
whereSP(E). = PeX'e + Wm t'em + Wc t'eCO



















EXCESS BURDEN AND FARM SIZE m ZEVENSON & ROUMASSET: MARKETS AND FAMILY SIZE 151
This shows that the real costs of children are not independent
of the educational choice, i.e, they are a function of the level ore and
the shadow price of E (human capital). Thus, E and N are jointly
determined in the model. Transactions costs can influence this shadow•
price in a number of ways. They can affect Pn Wm and, of course,•
•Wc the real value of child time. Since child earnings in agriculture or
thVough work in markets lower the real costs of children, the agency
cost-farm size analysis depicted in Figure 3 will apply • to fertility
choice. Households with low landholdings (be!owL'lOrL"l') will
be hiring out labor and the value to the family of their time will suffer
a loss, T'or T". On the other hand, relative to the nominal wage
Wh, households with large landholdings (greater than L' 2 or L"I, )
will experience a premium (E' or E") in the Value of their child work
because children can substitute for hired workers who are costly to
supervise. It should be noted that the real value of the time of the
mother will be similarly affected if she doesagricultural work or works
in the market.
These wage effects will then be transmitted into shadow price
effects on children. As transaction costs rise, a difference between
hiring in and hiring out households will emerge as regards family size,
child leisure, child human capital, and other dimensions of rural house-
hold behavior. This difference will be greater the greater are transac-
tion costs.
An examination of the shadow price expression shows that for a
hiring-in household_ a higher E' and hence, a higher We and Wm,
IowerSP(N) through thetacterm. Its impact through the tec terms isto
raise SP(E)and thus lower E. The total impact onSP(N)is thus indeter-
minate. A higher Wm raisesSP(E)and will hence Io'wer E This will
also have an indeterminate effect on SP(N) A higher W m will raise
SP(N)through the t'nm term. Thus, we cannot sign the-effect of E'
onSP(N)definitely-for hiring-in households although -we consicter it
highly likely that the tac term will dominate all others. This isbecause
the t'nm term is not likely to be too large becausemothers can combine
child care with farm work and because younger sibJings can also take
over some of the child care. The effect of a rise in E'onSP(E)is de-
finitely negative and should reduce E. It should also reduce child
leisure because, while it raises the value of•family work time, a rising
E has other negative income effects, e.g., it raises the cost of hired
workers; he'nce, it is unlikely to have the income effect that a wage
increase has.
These points are illustrated in •Figure4 where we have separated
the child earningsterm from other•parts of the shadow price of children
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shows that other costs,rise with N' because.of production constraints
(diminishing returns in the home production constraints). The curve
MUN + .W c (T'ac + TW'wc) shows diminishing marginal utility to N.
Desired N is N'without transaction costs. With transaction costs.
desired,N falls for hiring-out householdsand risesfor hiring-in house-
holds.
Empirical Application- Rural Philippine Households
,.. . • ,
The implications of the modelsdiscussedabove for family size
on fertility and for child health can be examined with data from a
survey of rural households in Laguna Province in the Philippines
(Popkin, King and Evenson 1978). This particular Laguna data set
is a pooled cross-section time seriesdata set for 241 rural households.
These householdswere surveyed in 1975, 1977, 1979 and 1982. The
key endogenousor choice variable in this analysis is the fertility choice
of the household.Since the bulk of the sample wasdrawn in 1975, the
1982 measureof children ever born is actually the completed family
size for more than two-thirds of the sample.We havethus opted to use
children ever born (CEB) as our measureof fertility. The age of the
mother isan independentexogenousvariable controlling for incomplete
fertility in our sample.
A secondaryendogenousor choicevariableof interestis a measure
of changesin the health of children in thesehouseholdsbetween 1979
and 1982. We havethree measuresof generalhealth for thesechildren:
(a) The changein height between1979 and 1982.
(b) The changein weight between1979 and 1982.
(c) The changein weight/height between1979 and 1982.
The logicof the model discussed abovestatesthat:
(1) Higher transactionscostsfor householdswith little land (i.e.,
hiring out households)Will causelower fertility, lesschild Work (more
child leisure), and better _:hildhealth gains-holding all other factors
constant.
(2) Higher transactions costs for householdswith large landhold-
ings (i.e., hiring in households)will Causehigher fertility, more child
work, and lowerhealth gains- holding other factors constant.
In order to test these propositions we require a measureof tran-
sactionscosts. Transactionscostsare not easyto measure.The Laguna
data are from householdslocated in 20 different barangays.The baran-154 ., JOURNAL OF PHI LIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
gays vary in size and distance from commercial activities as well as in
institutions. Thus, transactionscostsdovary in the cross-section sample
of households.
Our procedure for testing the basic proposition of this paperen-
tailed four steps:
In step 1 we estimated a probit equation predicting labor force
participation by adult men nand women.
In step 2 we "predicted" wagesfor men, women and children
actually working. A "Mills ratio" from stage1 was usedto correct for
selectivity bias.
In step 3 we utilized data on supervisiontime by farmers per hired
worker to predictan implicit transactionscost levelfor each barrio. The
predictedwagesfrom step 2 and the Mills ratiosfrom step 1 were used
in this analysis.
In step 4 we estimated fertility and health changeequations.The
Mills ratios from step 1, the predictedwagesfrom step 2 and the pre-
dicted transactionscostsfrom step 3 were included asregressors. The
predictedtransactionscostvariablewasinteractedwith farm sizeto test
the implicationsof the model.2
The step 1 probit equations utilized age,agesquared,education,
land farmed, a measureof wealth and several barrio dummy variables
for barrios as predictors.The wagepredictionequation utilized age,age
squared,educationand barrio dummiesaspredictors.
Table 1 reports the step 3 resultsmeasuringthe transactionscosts
variable.The regression includespredictedwagesof fathers (NFWAGE),
mothers (NMWAGE) and children (NCWAGE) from step 2 and the
mills ratios LANDAM and LAMDAF from step 1. The procedureis to
regress hoursof supervisiontime (SUP) on hours of hired work super-
vised,"interacted" with barrio dummy variables(someof the 20 barrios
are combined becauseof proximity to oneanother, on hoursof family
labor by men (FAMM) and women (FAMW) and exchange labor are
included in the regression,The coefficients on the hired labor-barrio
dummy variables are then treated as transactionscost indexes. This
procedure, while not ideal, does measurebarrio differences in supervi-
sion per hired hour of work. The fact that the family workers and ex-
2. Thisprocedure treatsfarm sizeasexogenous in the shortrun.We have
arguedthat farm sizewill respondto transactions costs andwill bejointly deter-
minedwith family size.In future work we will treatfarm sizeasendogenously




DEPVAR: SUP MSE R.SQUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
INTERCEPT 1 -16.685845 -0.8884
HIRE12 1 0.408159 3.8074
HIRE34 1 0.458874 1.5277
HI RE56 1 0.344776 1.5971
HIRE710 1 0.45?456 5.9063
HI RE11 1 0,847728 5.9684
HI RE12 1 0.529146 5.6482
HI RE1314 1 0.309987 1.8810
HIRE1516 1 0.618486 7.8457
HI RE1920 1 0.658436 7.6045
FARM 1 -0.012811 -0.1819
FAMW 1 0.107477 0.71'75
EXCT 1 0.018181 0.1399
NFWAGE 1 0.686173 0.9954
NMWAGE 1 0.495619 016799
NCWAGE 1 0.707337 0.5902
LAMDAM 1 - 16.888549 2.0873
LAMDAF 1 -15.209445 -2.3443
change worker coefficient are not significantly different form zero is
the basis for treating these coefficients as proxies for E' (see Figure 3),
Tables 2 and 3 report fertility regressions. In Table 2 the depen-
dent variable is children ever born (CEB). In Table 3, the dependent
variable is children born after age 25 of the mother (CHAF25). A com-
parison of the two tables is suggestive of the timing of contraceptive
behavior. In Table 2 we obtain the following "standard" results:
(a) The mortality rating (MORTCEB) is Positively correlated
with fertility.
(b) Distance from a family planning center (DISTFP) is positive-
ly related to fertility.
(c) Mother's education (M RD) is negatively related to fertility.
(d) Mother's wage levels (NMWAGE) are negatively related to




DEPVAR: CEB MSE R-SQUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
INTERCEPT i 5.351028 2.3140
MORTCEB 1 3.118607 2.2062
PRICE 1 0.032567 0.2445
LANDGE 1 -0.655135 -1,5395
YRUSED 1 -0.042487 -1.2308
INWEALTH 1 -.0000294382 -1.130i
DISTFP 1 0.027566 3.4687
MAGE 1 0.124509 4.1919
FED 1 0.019791 1.2468
MED 1 -0.071473 -3.1606
NCWAGE 1 -0.034021 -0.8448
NMWAGE 1 -0.029991 -0,2014
NFWAGE 1 -0.00377101 -0.1094
LAMDAM 1 -0.521952 -1,1933
LAM DAF 1 -0.122598 -0.4454
SUPRSD6 1 -3.280883 -1.9620
LANDSUP6 1 : 1.117107 1.3328
In addition, we find support for our basic, hypothesis.. The pre-
dicted transaction cost variable (SUPRSD6) has the expected negative
sign, and the interaction with farm size (LANDSUP6) has a positive
sign. Thus, .for low farm size, high transactions costs reduce fertility.
When farm size is high, high transactions costs,increase fertility. (The
size switch occurs at 2.9 hectares of land.) 3
Tables 4 and 5 provide further support for the model. It shows that
the effect of farm size on child health gains,holding transaction costscon-
stant, is positive. However, the impact of transaction costs (SUPRSD6)
depends on farm size. For low farm size, i.e., for households not hiring
in labor, high transactions costs-actually result in higher height and
3. This treatment of the land variable should be handled in a nonlinear
fashion. Changesin land size below the 1 point(s) andabovethe 2 point(s)




DEP VAR: CHAF'25 MSE R-SQUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
INTERCEPT 1 -1.436988 -0.8401
MORTCEB 1 0.868368 0.8305
PRICE 1 -0.063882 -0 6749
LAND 1 -0.584529 -1.8570
YRUSED 1 -0.027885 _-1.0921
INWEALTH 1 -.0000231066 -1.1993
DISTFP 1 0.008659537 1.4732
MAGE 1 0.182468 8.3054
FED 1 -0.000173419 -0.0148
MED 1 -0.020403 -1.2198
NCWAGE 1 -0.013479 -0.4525
NMWAGE 1 0.0006416607 0.0348
NFWAGE 1 -0.035769 -1.9089
LAMDAM 1 -0.325572 -1.0063
LAMDAF 1 -0.025709 -0.1260
SUPRSD6 1 -1.983971 -1.6043
LANDSUP6 1 1.075194 1.7343
weight gains. When farm size is large and the household is hiring in
labor, higher transaction costs reduce health gains. This may seem
counter-intuitive to some but it isconsistent withthe basic model. The
premium, E/, that children have in the hiring-in household results in
larger family size, more child work and lower health gains. The "dis-
count", T/, in hiring-out households results in lower family size, less
child work and lower health gains.
The effects on weight per unit of height are not very conclusive.
Since a factor impacting on health affects both height andweight gains,
we would not expect very strong impacts on the ratio. It is of interest
to note, however, that the coefficient of LANDSUP6 is positiveon
weight/height for children aged from 8 to 15. This suggests that the
"sweatshop" effect of transaction costs which leads to lower health
gains impacts more on height than Weight and that the impact on health
itself may not be too severe.1_ JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 4
REGRESSION FOR CHILDREN UNDER 8
JT
SSE F RATIO
DFE PROB > F
DEPMAR: CHANGEHT ' MSE R-SOUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
iNTERCEPT 1 5.351028 2.3140
SEX79 1 3.118607 2.2062
NMWAGE 1 0,032567 0.2445
NFWAGE 1 •-0.655135 -1.5395
NCWAGE 1 -0.042487 -1.2308
LAND 1 - 0.000294382 -1.1301
INWEALTH 1 0.027566 3.4687
FPCLINIC 1 0.124509 4.1919
FPDIST 1 0,019791 1.2468
SUPRSD6 1 -0.071473 .3.1606
LANDSUP6 1 -0.034021 .0.8448
A2 1 --0.029991 --0.2014
A3 I -0.00277101 -0.1094
A4 1 --0.581952 -1.1933
A5 1 -0.128998 -0.4454
A6 1
INTE RCEPT 1 17.444628 0.0000
SEX79 1 1.786907 3.0087
NMWAG E 1 0,026007 0.6044
NFWAGE 1 0.065698 1.6428
NCWAGE 1 -0.00652414 -0.0995
LAND 1 ).979897 1.1782
INWEALTH 1 -.0000163113 -0.5143
PFCLINIC 1 -58.195339 -0.0000
FPDIST 1 -0.00221462 -0.2282
SUPRSD6 1 3.412071 1.3197
LANDSUP6 1 -2.458428 -1.4114
A2 1 19.571506 21.7869
A3 1 11,744530 11.0•63!
A4 1 9.394404 9.2066
A5 1 5.620624 5.5473
A6 1 3.221217 3.1403EVENSON & ROUMASSET: MARKETS ANDFAMILYSIZE 159
Table4 (continued,)
'SSE F RATIO
DFE PROB > F
DEPVAR: WTHT MSE R-SQUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
INTERCEPT 1 -0.098824 2.3140
SEX79 1 -0.040422 2.2062
NMWAGE 1 -0.00037365 0.2445
NFWAGE I -0.00145486 -I.5395
NCWAGE I -0.000133967 1.2308
LAND I -0.010400 -I .I 301
INWEALTH 1 2.831285-07 3.4687
FPCLINIC 1 1.029699 4.1919
FPDIST 1 .00003879343 1.2488
SUPRSD6 1 -0.040551 -3.1606
LANDSUP6 1 0.024501 -0.8449
A2 1 -0.243304 -0.2014
A3 1 -0.117546 -0.1094
A4 1 -0.094675 -1.1 933
A5 1. -0.054271 -0.4454
A6 1 -0.026111 -1.9620
Conclusions
This test of transactions cost impacts on fertility and child health
is carried out in a small cross-section sample of households. A fuller
treatment of transactions costs could be made with a larger sample
where morevariations in transactions cost environments might be ob-
served. Given the limitation of the data, however, we believe that we
can claim empirical support for the basic propositions inherent in the
NHE-NIE model developed here. In view of the fact that public policies
can affect transactions cost environments, these findings have policy
relevance. They suggestthat further work on this topic will have merit, i160 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 5
REGRESSION FOR CHILDREN BETWEEN 8 AND 15
SSE F RATIO
DFE PROB> F
DEPVAR: CHANGEHT MSE R-SQUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
INTERCEPT I -37.689890 -0.0000
SEX79 I -0.624496 -i .7310
NMWAGE I -0.0023251 ] 0.1004
NFWAGE I 0.017868 0.7234
NCWAGE I 0.026250 0.6576
LAND 1 0.720404 1.4168
INWEALTH I .00000893028 0.3669
FPCLINIC I -21.279428 -0.0000
FPDIST I 0.012775 2.0092
SUPRSD6 I 2.590467 1.3562
LANDSUP6 I -I .903600 -I .9289
A8 I 13.723932 17.8385
A9 I I ] ,533914 15.,9277
At0 I 10,187260 14.2165
AII I 7.597643 10.4046
AI 2 I 5.689680 8.1430
A13 I 4.392379 5.7424
A14 I 2.499382 3.0743
INTERCEPT I -50.849548 -0.0000
SEX79 I -4.252602 -3.4922
NMWAGE ] -0.00199552 -0.0255
NFWAGE I 0.106122 1.2729
NCWAGE 1 0.005402928 0.0401
LAND I 3.964313 2.3099
INWEALTH I -.0000136504 -0.1661
FPCLINIC I -36.271090 -0.0000
FPDIST I 0.045076 2.1003
SUPRSD6 I 8,614450 1.3362
LANDSUP6 I -89.780459 -2.9361
A8 I 48.771678 18.7812
A9 1 43.053490 17.6141
At0 I 41.345756 17.0939EVENSON & ROUMASSET: MARKETS ANDFAMILYSIZE 161
Table $ ( continued)
SSE F RATIO
DFE PROB > F
DEPVAR: WTHT MSE R-SQUARE
PARAMETER
VARIABLE DF ESTIMATE T RATIO
All 1 32.384763 13.1390
A12 1 27.630967 11.7157
A13 1 18.565940 7.1910
A14 1 13.430508 4.8941
int_rcept 1 0.212151 0.()000
SEX79 1 0.066050 3.7315
NMWAGE 1 0.0002163624 0.1904
NFWAGE I -0.00147914 -I .2206
NCWAG£ 1 0.000496771 0.2537
LAND 1 -0.060158 -2.4115
INWEALTH 1 3.96897E-07 0.3324
FPCLINIC 1 1.247821 0.0000
FPDIST 1 -0.000563043 -1.8049
SUPRSD6 1 -0.089603 -0.9562
LANDSUP6 I 0.143224 2.9581
A8 I -0.618066 -I 6.,3743
A9 I -0.540599 -I 5,2160
AI0 I -0.530690 --I 5..0947
AII I -0.402901 -i 1.2459
A12 I -0.353269 -I 0.3051
A13 I -0.220820 .5,8842
A14 I -0.160556 --4.0252162 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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